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IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
ACT: MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE,
FENNER & SMITH, INC.
v CURRAN
OHN J. Curran and Jacquelyn Curran opened several commodity'
accounts with Merrill Lynch in 1973. The Currans deposited
$100,000 with a broker who made all trading decisions and exercised
complete control over the accounts.2 Initially, the Currans realized profits
from the accounts and made some withdrawals. Later, as the accounts
sharply declined in value, they requested the accounts be closed. The bro-
ker at first refused, but assented in 1974 after the Currans' capital declined
to $6,000. 3 Alleging that the broker made false representations concerning
the accounts, failed to observe safeguards and loss limits, and made trades
with the sole intention of generating commissions, the Currans brought an
action for damages against Merrill Lynch. They alleged violations of the
Commodity Exchange Act,4 federal securities law,5 and state law.6 The
1. Section 2 of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended in 1978, defines commodity
to include all goods and articles and all services, rights, and interests that are the subject of
future contracts. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). A commodity future is a standard-
ized contract for purchase or sale of a specified quantity and grade of a commodity for
delivery at a specified future date at the price agreed upon in the contract. Bromberg, Com-
modities Law and Securities Law--Overlaps and Preemptions, 1 J. CORP. L. 217, 242 (1976).
See generally Hudson, Consumer Protection in the Commodity Futures Market, 58 B.U.L.
REV. 1 (1978) (describing commodity trading in general and various types of fraudulent
activities by brokers); Wolff, Comparative Federal Regulation of the Commodities Exchanges
and the National Securities Exchanges, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 223 (1969) (discussing regu-
latory provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and Securities Exchange Act that protect
public interest).
2. This type of account is termed a discretionary account. The customer makes a de-
posit and gives the broker authority to buy and sell at the broker's discretion without con-
sulting the customer. These accounts are more common in commodities trading than in the
trading of securities because, unlike the securities market, prices in the commodities market
may move sharply, requiring fast trading action. Bromberg, supra note 1, at 248. Merrill
Lynch disputed this description of the Currans' accounts, but agreed to the classsification of
the accounts as discretionary for the purposes of this appeal on questions of law. Curran v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 220 (6th Cir. 1980), affd, 102 S.
Ct. 1825, 72 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982).
3. The record does not reveal the Currans' total investment in the accounts after the
initial deposit of $100,000. At one point they did withdraw $101,000. The Currans alleged
that by the time the accounts were closed, the accounts had declined in value $175,000 and
only $6,000 in capital remained. 622 F.2d at 220.
4. Commodity Exchange Act § 4b, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976).
5. Specifically, the Currans alleged violation of rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5
(1981) and § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (1976). 622
F.2d at 219.
6. The complaint alleged violations of § 410(a)(2) of the Michigan Uniform Securities
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district court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment
and dismissed the claims brought under federal securities law.7 The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the federal secur-
ities law claims.8 Although the issue was not raised on appeal, the Sixth
Circuit also considered the question of whether an implied right of action
exists under the Commodity Exchange Act. After finding that such a right
does exist, the appellate court ruled that the action could properly be
maintained on remand to the district court.9 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in this and three companion cases involving simi-
lar disputes.10 Held, affirmed: A private party may maintain an action for
damages incurred as a result of violation of the Commodity Exchange Act
although the Act contains no express provision for such a remedy. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 72 L. Ed. 2d
182 (1982).
I. COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT: DEVELOPMENT OF
THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The Commodity Exchange Act" has its origins in the Future Trading
Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.501 (1967 & Supp. 1982). 622 F.2d at 219.
7. 622 F.2d at 218-19. The district court ruled that a discretionary commodity account
is not a security and is not subject to provisions of federal securities laws. Id. at 219.
8. Id. at 222. In determining whether a discretionary commodity account is an invest-
ment contract and thus subject to claims under securities laws, the Sixth Circuit used the
standard set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Howey the Court
defined an investment contract as "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person in-
vests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party." Id. at 298-99. After finding the Howey common enterprise
element missing, the Sixth Circuit in Curran held that a discretionary commodity account is
not a security. 622 F.2d at 222. The court adopted the reasoning of Milnarik v. M-S Com-
modities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.) (common enterprise only present in horizontal rela-
tionship between pool of investors and not in vertical arrangement betweeen one investor
and the broker), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
9. The court stated that remand to the district court for additional proceedings neces-
sarily raised the question of whether the action could be maintained. 622 F.2d at 230. Rec-
ognizing that a court of appeals should ordinarily limit its review to the questions raised, id.
at 230 n.17, the court nevertheless decided the question in order to offer direction to the
district court and avoid further delay, id. at 230.
10. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980) (consolidating New York Mercantile
Exch. v. Leist; Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Leist; Heinhold Commodities, Inc. v. Leist), aj'd
sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 72 L. Ed.
2d 182 (1982). These three cases arose from trading in futures contracts for Maine potatoes
in May 1976. Plaintiffs, as speculators, alleged damages from two separate conspiracies to
manipulate prices. In both alleged conspiracies, the traders amassed contracts in excess of
the number allowed by Exchange rules. Plaintiffs sued the New York Exchange and its
officials alleging that the violations were not reported to the Commission and that the Ex-
change did not use its power to avert the price manipulation. They also sued the brokers
alleged to have participated in the conspiracy as well as other speculators. These cases pose
the same general question of whether an implied private right of action exists under the
Commodity Exchange Act.
11. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). For discussion of the Act's statutory
history, see Davis, The Commodity Exchange Act: Statutory Silence is Not Authorizationfor
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Act of 1921,12 Congress's first effort to regulate commodity futures trading.
Although limited to grain futures, this statute established the pattern of
restricting trading to central exchanges designated by the Secretary of Ag-
riculture and subject to government supervision. The 1921 statute charged
these contract markets with policing themselves by adopting measures to
prevent price manipulation. Violators were subject to a fine or imprison-
ment. After the Supreme Court declared this initial legislation unconstitu-
tional,' 3 Congress enacted the virtually identical Grain Futures Act of
1922.14
In 1936 Congress significantly expanded the coverage of the statute to
other commodities' 5 and changed its name to the Commodity Exchange
Act.' 6 The 1936 additions include section 4b,17 the antifraud provision,
and section 4a,18 which empowers the Commission to set quantitative lim-
its on speculative trading. Another added section requires registration of
merchants and brokers.' 9 Congress extended the fines and imprisonment
sanctions to cover anyone attempting to manipulate or manipulating the
price of any commodity.20 In 1968 amendments to the Act extended regu-
lation to additional commodities, 2' and added a provision, section 5a(8), 22
requiring an exchange to enforce its rules. Increased penalties made price
manipulation a felony.23
Prior to 1974 Congress enacted the major provisions upon which im-
plied causes of action might be based.24 Although the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act of 1974 significantly changed the Act, 25 the
amendments did not affect these provisions. In 1974, however, Congress
broadened coverage of the Act to include not only agricultural goods, but
all goods or services in which futures contracts are dealt.26 Congress trans-
Judicial Legislation of an Implied Private Right ofAction, 46 Mo. L. REV. 316 (1981); Note,
Private Rights ofActionfor Commodity Futures Investors, 55 B.U.L. REV. 804 (1975).
12. Ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (declared unconstitutional).
13. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (unconstitutional exercise of taxing power to
assess penalty for failure to comply with regulatory statute).
14. Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1976)).
15. § 3(a) of the 1936 amendments extended coverage to cotton, rice, butter, eggs, and
Irish potatoes. Ch. 545, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp.
IV 1980)).
16. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
17. Id.§6b.
18. Id. § 6a.
19. Id. §§ 6d(l), 6e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
20. Id. § 13 (Supp. IV 1980).
21. The additions included livestock and livestock products. Pub. L. No. 90-258, § 1, 82
Stat. 26 (1968) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1980)).
22. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8)-(9) (1976).
23. Id. § 13 (Supp. IV 1980).
24. Sections forming the bases for implied causes of action in the cases before the Court
include Commodity Exchange Act §§ 4a, 4b, 5a(8), 5d, 9(b), 7 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 6b, 7, 7a, 13
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
25. See Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 780 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974), which called the 1974 amendments "the first complete
overhaul" of the Act), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 1228, 72 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1982) (re-
manding for consideration in light of Curran decision).
26. Pub. L. No. 93-463, §§ 202-203, 88 Stat. 1395 (1974) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2
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ferred responsibility for enforcement from the Secretary of Agriculture to
a newly created Commodity Futures Trading Commission having broad
regulatory powers.27 The Commission's powers include the power to sue
in federal court for injunctive relief from conduct of markets or traders in
violation of the Act 28 and to conduct disciplinary proceedings against ex-
change members who violate regulations. 29 Congress increased civil fines
for individuals or exchanges who violate the Act. 30 Additionally, the 1974
Act provides procedures for individuals injured by violation of the Act.
The Act requires each exchange to offer arbitration for settlement of cus-
tomer claims involving less than $15,000. 3 1 The Act also provides for an
administrative procedure that allows complaints to be filed and eventually
ruled upon by an administrative law judge authorized to order payment of
damages. 32
II. CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS: HISTORY OF THE CASE LAW
When Congress enacts a statute, such as the Commodity Exchange Act,
making certain activities unlawful without incorporating a specific provi-
sion that allows private rights of action, the Supreme Court will provide a
remedy if it finds implicit intent by Congress to create that remedy. The
Court first recognized an implied private cause of action 33 under a federal
statute in 1916 in Texas & PacFc Railway v. Rigsby.34 In Rigsby the Court
upheld the right of a railroad switchman to recover damages for injuries
that resulted from a violation of federal safety standards. The safety stat-
ute provided penal sanctions, but not a private remedy. Relying on com-
mon law principles,35 the Court emphasized that when a member of the
special class for whose benefit the statute was enacted is damaged, then a
(Supp. IV 1980)). Under this broader definition, the Commodity Exchange was extended to
cover trading in plywood, metals such as copper, gold, and silver, currency, and interest rate
futures. See Davis, supra note 11, at 317.
27. 7 U.S.C. § 4a (Supp. IV 1980).
28. Id. § 13a-I (1976).
29. Id. § 12c (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
30. Id. §§ 13a, 13b.
31. Id. § 7a(l 1) (Supp. IV 1980).
32. Id. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
33. Various commentators have traced the history of the development of implied causes
of action. See Maher, Implied Private Rights of Action and the Federal Securities Laws:. A
Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 783 (1980); McMahon & Rodos, Judicial
Implication of Private Causes afAction." Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV.
167 (1976); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 285 (1963).
34. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). For cases attributing the origin of implied actions to Rigsby, see
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 n.10 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975); Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 298 (2d Cir. 1980), a'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 72 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982). But see
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell argued that the use of "im-
plied private right of action" in Rigsby carried a different connotation and could not be
taken as authority for its present meaning. Id.
35. Implied rights have their origin in English common law. In Rigsby the Court
quoted the maxim, attributed to Blackstone, "where there is a right there is a remedy." 241
U.S. at 39-40; see McMahon & Rodos, supra note 33, at 168.
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private remedy is implicit.36
Applying the Rigsby reasoning, the courts frequently implied private
rights of action in the years that followed.37 The courts, however, could no
longer find an implied private right of action based on common law princi-
ples after the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins38 declared that
no federal general common law exists. Because federal jurisdiction after
Erie could only be based on the Constitution or federal statutes, the Court
couched its subsequent opinions in terms of enforcing federal statutory
rights. The Court, therefore, acted on the basis of its understanding of
congressional intent to create private rights of action under a given
statute. 39
Particularly in the area of securities regulation,40 a strong precedent de-
veloped for recognizing private rights of action.4 1 In J.1 Case Co. v.
36. 241 U.S. at 39.
37. Implied causes of action were sustained under a number of different statutes. See
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544 (1969); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); United States
v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972); Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
For discussion of implied causes of action in a specific context, see Crawford & Schneider,
The Implied Private Cause ofAction and the FederalAviation Act: .4 Practical 4,pplication of
Cor v. Ash, 23 VILL. L. REV. 657 (1978); Sales, Does the FDCAct Create a Private Right of
Action?, 28 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 501 (1973); Comment, Private Rights ofAction Under
Title IX, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 425 (1978); Note, Implied Civil Remedies Under Sec-
tion 17(a) of the Securties Act of 1933, 53 B.U.L. REV. 70 (1973). For general discussion of
early decisions, see Note, supra note 33.
38. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie held that in the absence of a constitutional or statutory
provision, state law is binding on federal courts. The Constitution does not grant power to
federal courts to decide cases based on a general federal common law. Id. at 78.
39. For discussion of the various rationales for implying causes of action, see Note, An
Implied Private Right of Action Under Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange 4ct of 1934,
23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 155 (1971); Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions
Under Federal Statutes- Judicial Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judici-
ary?, 43 FORDHAM L. REV, 441 (1974).
40. Implied causes of action have been upheld under different sections and rules of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir.
1959) (§ 7 margin rules); Fishman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (§§ 10
and 15(c)(1) antifraud provisions); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (§ 6(a)(1) re-
quiring exchanges to enforce rules), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Opper v. Hancock Sec.
Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.) (rules 15cl-2 and lOb-5), a fd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir.
1966); Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Midwest Stock Exch., 178 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1959)
(§ 12(f) requiring authorization before stock could be traded); Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (rule 17a-5 requiring filing certi-
fied statements and § I I(d)(2) requiring certain confirmations). See generally Lowenfels,
Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 12 (1966); Maher,
supra note 33.
41. Recognition of private rights of action under rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1981), has had by far the greatest impact in terms of the enormous volume of litigation
brought under this rule. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COM-
MODITIES FRAUD § 2.4(110) (1982); see 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3869-73 (1969).
An implied cause of action under rule lob-5 was first recognized in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), in which the court decided that the general
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act compelled that conclusion. Id. at 514. After J.I.
Case Co. v Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), which was not a lOb-5 case, the enormous popularity
of rule lob-5 actions developed. Until 1971 these cases were litigated in the lower federal
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Borak42 a shareholder charged that proxy solicitation material for secur-
ing shareholder approval of a corporate merger was false and misleading
in violation of SEC rules. 43 The Court noted that although Congress made
no specific reference to private rights under the section prohibiting false
and misleading statements, Congress did grant jurisdiction to district
courts over all suits brought to enforce any liability created under the Se-
curities Exchange Act. 44 The Court further noted that the purpose of the
statute was to protect investors from deceptive practices by management or
others seeking to secure proxy votes. 45 Reasoning that the standards set by
Congress evidenced the broad remedial purposes of the statute, the Court
implied a private right of action on the theory that it had a duty to provide
the remedies necessary to carry out the congressional purpose.46 Follow-
ing the Borak ruling, courts routinely recognized private rights of action in
securities cases.
47
In other types of cases, however, the Supreme Court refused to imply a
cause of action.48 Thus the question of when an implied right would be
recognized went unanswered. In resolving this question in specific cases,
the Court focused on the remedies provided in the statute. In Securities
Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour49 and National Railroad Passenger
courts without explicit recognition by the Supreme Court that an implied right of action
exists under rule lOb-5. Maher, supra note 33, at 795. In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), the Court first recognized an implied right of action
under rule lOb-5 in a footnote. Id. at 13 n.9. The Court has continued to recognize private
rights of action under rule lOb-5, but has in some cases restricted private suits on other
grounds, such as standing. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975). This recognition of an implied right may, however, reflect the unique history of rule
lob-5 without articulating standards of general applicability. Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.19 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
690 n. 13 (1979) (both stating that the Court simply acquiesced in the 25-year-old acceptance
by lower courts of an implied action under rule lOb-5).
42. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
43. Id. at 429, 429 n.4 (alleging violation of rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981)).
44. 377 U.S. at 431.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 433. In Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the Court ex-
panded this reasoning to imply a cause of action if the effectiveness of the statute would be
severely hampered without an implied right of action. Id. at 556-57.
47. Noting that implied causes of action have been almost unanimously recognized
under the Securities Exchange Act, Judge Friendly drew heavily on the analogy to securities
law in arguing for the majority in Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1980), afl'd
sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 72 L. Ed.
2d 182 (1982). Put see Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws.- The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891, 892-900 (1977) (suggesting that a stricter
approach to private causes of action is developing).
48. See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 135 (1964) (no private right under a statute guar-
anteeing union members right to vote in union election, because administrative procedures
provided); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (no private cause of action to
recover unreasonable charges from motor carrier, because sections of statute other than sec-
tion on motor carriers included remedies); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S.
373 (1958) (no private right of action against violators of Clayton Act who made sales at
unreasonable prices to eliminate competition); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern
Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (no private cause of action for recovery of past unreason-
able utility rate charges under Federal Power Act).
49. 421 U.S. 412 (1975). The Court held that no private right of action existed by which
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Corp. v. National Association ofRailroad Passengers (Amtrak)50 the Court
concluded that if the language of a statute expressly provided for one
method of enforcement, then other methods, including private actions,
were necessarily excluded. 5' According to the Court, in both of these in-
stances, Congress established comprehensive enforcement procedures. Be-
cause enforcement was vested in the Securities Exchange Commission and
the Attorney General, respectively, the Court refused to imply a private
right of action.52
In this same context, the Court, in 1975, handed down Cort v. Ash. 3 In
Cort the Court, incorporating elements of previous decisions, identified
four factors to be considered in determining whether a private right of
action should be recognized although it is not expressly provided in a stat-
ute.5 4 First, is the plaintiff a member of the class Congress intended to
benefit by the statute?55 Second, is there evidence that Congress intended
to create a remedy or to deny one?56 Third, is implying a remedy consis-
tent with the underlying purpose of the act? 57 Fourth, would allowing a
private action invade an area traditionally covered by state law?58
The plaintiff in Cort was a shareholder of a corporation that sponsored
political advertisements during the 1972 presidential election. Alleging vi-
olation of the criminal provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act,59
Ash brought an action against corporate directors for damages. Applying
the four-pronged analysis, the Court refused to imply a right of action on
the behalf of the stockholder.60 The Court first determined that the pur-
pose of the legislation was to prevent the possible corrupting influence of
customers of a failing brokerage firm could compel the Securities Investor Protection Corpo-
ration to initiate liquidation proceedings. Id. at 421.
50. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). The Court refused to entertain a suit brought by aggrieved rail
passengers seeking to enjoin discontinuation of rail service. Id. at 464-65.
51. 414 U.S. at 458. This principle is based on the tenet expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
521 (rev. 5th ed. 1979); see Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929).
52. Barbour, 421 U.S. at 420; Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 458.
53. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Numerous commentators have written on the impact of Cori.
See, e.g., Maher, supra note 33, at 796-99; Comment, Private Rights ofAction Under Amtrak
and Ash: Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975); Note, Implica-
tion of Private Actions from Federal Statutes: From Borak to Ash, I J. CORP. L. 371 (1976);
Note, Emerging Standards/or ImpliedActions Under Federal Statutes, 9 U. MICH. J. L. REF.
294 (1976).
54. 422 U.S. at 78.
55. Id. For this proposition the Court cited Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916). This factor essentially involves standing to sue.
56. 422 U.S. at 78 (citing.4mtrak, 414 U.S. at 455).
57. 422 U.S. at 78 (relying upon Barbour, 421 U.S. at 412; Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 455;
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964)); cf. Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways,
Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962) (Court should only imply remedy after considering what effect rem-
edy will have on regulatory scheme).
58. 422 U.S. at 78 (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963)).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (repealed 1976) (prohibited corporations, banks, and labor organi-
zations from making expenditures in connection with presidential elections and provided
criminal penalties).
60. 422 U.S. at 80-85.
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corporate wealth in elections.61 Given this purpose, the Court argued that
stockholders were not the intended beneficiaries of the Act. 62 Next, the
Court found no indication of congressional intent to create a private right
to damages. 63 Finally, the Court concluded that implying a remedy would
not further the purpose of the legislation and would intrude into an area
traditionally committed to state law.64
Despite the apparent clarity of the four-part analysis outlined by the
Court in Co-t, application of the criteria proved difficult. Several split de-
cisions by the Supreme Court65 and confusion among the circuits re-
sulted.66 In 1979 three decisions involving implied causes of action were
handed down by the Supreme Court. In the first, Cannon v. University of
Chicago,67 the plaintiff was refused admission to medical school, allegedly
as a result of sex discrimination. She sought to bring an action under title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.68 Title IX provides for admin-
istrative action to cut off federal funding to institutions engaged in discrim-
ination, but does not provide private remedies. 69 The Court found an
implied cause of action under the Cort test, but the opinion spoke for only
three Justices.70 The impact of the more restrictive Cort analysis was evi-
dent, however. The opinion emphasized that the Court will imply a pri-
vate remedy only under certain limited circumstances in the absence of
clear congressional intent to create private rights.71
In the other two 1979 decisions that applied the Cort test, the Court
refused to find an implied right of action. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Reding-
ton72 the Court held that the four factors of the Cori analysis were not
entitled to equal weight. While reaffirming the Cori reasoning, the Court
placed special emphasis upon the legislative intent factor.73 Redington in-
volved an action against an accounting firm that had prepared reports on
an insolvent brokerage firm's financial condition. Customers of the
brokerage firm brought suit under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act, the recordkeeping and reporting provision.74 Finding no affirmative
evidence in the legislative history of intent to create private remedies
61. Id. at 80.
62. Id. at 82.
63. Id. at 82-83.
64. Id. at 84-85.
65. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
66. After Cori some lower courts continued to recognize implied rights of action under
federal statutes. See, e.g., Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1978); New York
Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978);
Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976).
67. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
69. Id.
70. Three Justices concurred specially and three dissented. Justice Powell traced the
history of implied causes of action in his lengthy dissent. 441 U.S. at 730.
71. Id. at 717.
72. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
73. Id. at 575-76.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
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NOTES
under this section, the Court refused to imply a cause of action.75
Continuing this more restrictive approach, the Court in Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis76 held that no right to private actions for
damages is implied under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.77 Al-
though the Investment Advisors Act was intended to benefit clients by es-
tablishing standards of conduct for their investment advisors, it does not
expressly provide for private remedies; rather, it expressly provides for
other means of enforcement. The Court emphasized that when Congress
provides adequate means of enforcement in a statute, and alternate reme-
dies exist, these remedies are exclusive in the absence of contrary legisla-
tive intent.78
Prior to Curran no Supreme Court decisions dealt with the validity of a
private right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act.79 A number
of district courts and circuit courts, however, addressed the question. De-
cisions prior to 1974 constituted the contemporary legal context in which
Congress enacted the 1974 amendments. 80 Goodman v. H Hentz & CO. 81
was the first decision to address specifically the issue of implied rights of
action under the Commodity Exchange Act. In this buyers' action for
fraud against a broker-dealer, the district court held that an implied right
exists under the Commodity Exchange Act.8 2 The Goodman court based
its ruling on state common law tort principles and the fact that the Act did
not prohibit private actions.8 3 Subsequent cases decided before the 1974
amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act followed the Goodman rul-
ing, typically without comment.8 4
75. 442 U.S. at 569-71; cf. Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill.
1967) (right implied if act does not prohibit private actions).
76. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
78. 444 U.S. at 20. The Court continued to use this restrictive approach in several later
cases. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981); Texas Indus., -Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); California v. Sierra
Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
79. One case involving implied rights of action under the Commodity Exchange Act
came before the Court. The case, however, was decided on primary jurisdiction grounds.
Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973), rev'g Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber
& Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1973). The-Court decided that the Commodity Exchange
Commission had primary jurisdiction and directed the plaintiffs to proceed before the Com-
mission. The meaning of the Deaktor decision was the subject of disagreement in Curran.
The Curran majority said that Deaktor did not question the availability of private rights of
action under the Commodity Exchange Act. 102 S. Ct. at 1840 n.65, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 203
n.65. The dissent pointed out that Deaktor could also mean that no private rights of action
can arise in the courts because of the procedures for relief available through the Commis-
sion. Id. at 1850 n.6, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 214 n.6.
80. Curran, 102 S. Ct. at 1839, 72 L Ed. 2d at 201.
81. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Il. 1967).
82. Id. at 447.
83. Id.
84. See Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Serv., 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970); Selig-
son v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd sub nom. Miller v.
New York Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762, 768 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977);
Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61, 65 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Gould v. Barnes Brokerage
Co., 345 F. Supp. 294, 295 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Johnson v. Arthur Epsey, Shearson, Hamill &
Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338,
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Cases decided after 1974 were not in agreement, however, on the ques-
tion of whether private rights of action survived the amendments of that
year.85 The Cort four-pronged analysis may also have contributed to the
confusion.86 The Sixth and Second Circuits found an implied right of ac-
tion,87 while the Fifth Circuit refused to imply such a right in a similar
case.88 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Curran for
the purpose of resolving the conflict among the circuits.
III. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, IvC. v CURRAv
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran the Supreme
Court held that a private party may maintain an action for damages as a
result of violation of the Commodity Exchange Act.8 9 In so holding the
Court narrowed its Cort analysis to congressional intent90 as the disposi-
tive question in deciding if a private right of action should be implied
under the Commodity Exchange Act after the 1974 amendments. The
Court elaborated a two-part analysis for determining congressional intent.
First, the Court focused on the state of the law at the time of the legisla-
tion.9' Then, the Court examined the legislative history of the 1974
amendments. 92
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, 93 reaffirmed the
Court's adherence in theory to the strict approach of Cort v. Ash,94 while at
1343 (E.D. La. 1972), af'd, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l
Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1375, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Anderson v. Francis I. du Pont & Co., 291
F. Supp. 705, 710 (D. Minn. 1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 430
(N.D. Cal. 1968), modifoed on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
85. Some courts presumed the continuing validity of private actions under the Act after
1974. See Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (2d
Cir. 1977); Case & Co. v. Board of Trade, 523 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1975); E.F. Hutton &
Co. v. Lewis, 410 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Other courts determined that the
1974 amendments extinguished private rights of action. See Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481
F. Supp. 53, 54-55 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 311, 321 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
86. See Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 55-57 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Berman v.
Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 321-23 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
87. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980);
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980). These two cases were consolidated by the
Supreme Court as Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1826, 72
L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982).
88. Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980) (emphasizing the compre-
hensive regulatory scheme of 1974 amendments and powers vested in Commodity Futures
Trading Commission to enforce rules and engage in arbitration of private claims), vacated
and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 1228, 72 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1982) (remanding to Fifth Circuit for
further consideration in light of Curran).
89. 102 S. Ct. 1826, 72 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982).
90. "The key to this case is our understanding of the intent of Congress in 1974 when it
comprehensively reexamined and strengthened the federal regulation of futures trading."
Id. at 1839, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 187.
91. Id. at 1839-41, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 201-03.
92. Id. at 1841-44 nn.81-86, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 206 nn.81-86.
93. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined the opinion of the Court.
94. 102 S. Ct. at 1827, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 187. The Court implied that the Cort test was
strict and would result in fewer instances in which the Court would imply a private right of
action. Contra Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 740 (1979) (Powell, J., dis-
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the same time abandoning three of the four Cori criteria in favor of the
single criterion of congressional intent.95 The Court concluded that once it
resolved the dispositive question of legislative intent, no need to consider
the other three factors remained. 96
Justice Stevens argued that in determining congressional intent the ini-
tial inquiry must be into the state of the law at the time Congress passed
the legislation. Specifically, the Court must inquire into Congress's per-
ception of the law it was reshaping. 97 If the courts already recognized an
implied remedy, then the question was whether Congress intended to pre-
serve the remedy. 98 Finding that cases prior to 1974 uniformly recognized
an implied cause of action under the Commodity Exchange Act, 99 Justice
Stevens concluded that such an implied right was clearly part of the con-
temporary legal context in which Congress had acted.' °° Because the
Court presumed that Congess was aware of the judicial interpretation of
its statutes, the Court charged Congress with knowledge of these cases.' 0
Justice Stevens further noted that Congress left intact the provision under
which the courts had implied a cause of action 0 2 while at the same time
enacting amendments to other parts of the Act. The majority argued that
this evidenced Congress's affirmative intention to preserve the remedy. 0 3
In the second part of its congressional intent analysis the majority ex-
amined the legislative history of the 1974 amendments. Referring to state-
ments made in committee hearings and in the Congressional Record, the
majority concluded that Congress generally understood that the amend-
ments would not interfere with private rights of action. 1°4 The majority
also cited the addition of a savings clause' 05 as a compelling inference that
senting) (suggesting that Cort invited courts to legislate). See supra notes 53-64 and accom-
panying text.
95. The Court in Redington and Transamerica had moved toward special emphasis on
legislative intent, but had not eliminated consideration of the other three factors. See supra
notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
96. 102 S. Ct. at 1844,72 L. Ed. 2d at 207 (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,
302 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
97. 102 S. Ct. at 1839, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 201.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1839-40, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 201-02. But see cases cited supra note 48.
100. 102 S. Ct. at 1844, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 207.
101. Id. at 1841 n.66, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 203 n.66. The Court cited Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978), for the proposition that when Congress adopts a new law incorpo-
rating an old law, Congress is presumed to be aware of the judicial interpretation. Id. The
dissent pointed out that Congress did not reenact the provisions in question in 1974, but
rather failed to amend them. Id. at 1852 n.ll, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 216 n.ll.
102. Most of the litigation concerned violations of the antifraud provisions of the Com-
modity Exchange Act, §§ 4a, 4b, 6b, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 6b, 8 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)., See cases
cited supra note 84.
103. 102 S. Ct. at 1844, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 207.
104. Id. at 1839-41, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 204-06; cf. Rivers v. Rosenthal, 634 F.2d 774, 786 (5th
Cir. 1980) (references to implied causes of action in legislative history relatively isolated
among hundreds of pages of testimony), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 1228, 72 L. Ed. 2d
841 (1982).
105. The savings clause provides that "nothing in this section shall supersede or limit the
jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United States of any State." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV
1980).
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Congress intended to preserve preexisting remedies. 0 6 The Court con-
cluded that congressional intent to preserve a private cause of action was
compelling and could only have been made clearer by an express provision
that was considered unnecessary given the legal context in 1974. 107
Having determined that Congress intended to preserve an implied pri-
vate right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act, the Court turned
to the question of standing to sue. The three companion cases, involving
the potato futures conspiracy, raised this question. Noting that the Cort
test does not reach this question, t08 the Court concluded that speculators,
as the intended beneficiaries of commodities regulation, have standing to
sue. 10 9 The Court concluded further that the implied right, which survived
the 1974 amendments, included the right to sue an exchange or anyone
involved in violating exchange rules." 0
Justice Powell in dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor, argued that a handful of district court decisions,
which erroneously implied a cause of action based on common law princi-
ples not applicable in federal court, could not possibly have constituted the
law in 1974."' The dissent further argued that the Court could not pre-
sume that Congress approved those decisions by failing to amend certain
sections of the Comm9 dity Exchange Act." 2 Thus the dissent charged
that the majority, while asserting fidelity to the principles of recent Court
decisions, actually failed to apply them.' '3
In Curran the Court signalled a return to less stringent requirements for
implying a cause of action. While voicing its adherence to recent deci-
sions, the Court nevertheless demonstrated a willingness to infer congres-
sional intent from less definitive indicators than those required in its other
decisions since Cort.114 The strict approach of Cort gave way in Curran to
an examination of evidence requiring judicial interpretation.
After Curran, Congress is charged with knowledge of how the courts,
even lower federal courts, have interpreted statutes. In addition, Congress
is presumed to have approved the interpretation if it leaves those parts of
the statute intact at the time of amendment. Less clear after Curran is the
question of whether the same analysis can be applied to situations in which
the statute in question was passed after 1975 and the Cort decision." 15 In
106. 102 S. Ct. at 1843, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 206; cf. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1981) (no right of action implied from
savings clause).
107. 102 S. Ct. at 1843-44, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 206-07.
108. Id. at 1846 n.92, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 209 n.92.
109. Id. at 1845, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 208.
110. Id. at 1847, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 211.
!11. Id. at 1848, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 211-12. Justice Powell called this theory "incompatible
with our constitutional separation of powers, and in my view it is without support in logic or
in law." Id.
112. Id. at 1852, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 216.
113. Id. at 1849, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 213.
114. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
115.' Because the Court presumed that Congress has knowledge of the Cori decision and
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Curran the Court's finding that an implied cause of action was part of the
contemporary legal context in 1974 was based partly on the absence of any
dispute over that proposition prior to Cort. 1
6
Specifically, with regard to the Commodity Exchange Act, the Curran
opinion opens the way once again for private litigation based on implied
causes of action with assurance of consistency in results among the cir-
cuits. 17 Extending this ruling to other federal regulatory statutes, the Cur-
ran opinion will clearly have wide ranging impact. In Curran the
hallmark of the test of legislative intent was the state of the law at the time
Congress passed the statute. Because most major federal regulatory stat-
utes were passed during the time when private rights of action were gener-
ally implied by the courts, the practical effect of the ruling may be a
reversal of the recent trend to deny private actions.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran the Court held
that private parties may sue for damages resulting from violations of the
Commodity Exchange Act. In finding an implied right under a statute that
does not directly address private rights, the Court modified its recent trend
toward strict statutory interpretation. In Curran the Court went beyond
the statute to consider congressional intent in determining if a private right
is implicit in a statute. The Court construed congressional intent in terms
of the state of the law, including judicial interpretations, at the time the
statute was passed. Moreover, under the Curran reasoning, congressional
silence was construed as intent to maintain the preexisting state of the law.
The Court's decision removes any doubt regarding the implied rights of
investors to bring actions under the Commodity Exchange Act. If the
principles elaborated by the Court in Curran are applied outside the com-
modities area, these less stringent standards for finding implied congres-
sional intent would leave the courts free to recognize private rights in most
cases.
Yvonne S, Specht
the Court's restrictive approach to inferring intent, in the future Congress must affirmatively
indicate any intent to create private rights of action.
116. 102 S. Ct. at 1841, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 203.
117. The Supreme Court's opinion in Curran bears out Judge Friendly's observation that
"the rumors about the death of the implied cause of action which have been circulating in
the wake of these decisions [Cannon, Redingion, and Transamerica] are exaggerated .
Curran, 638 F.2d at 316.
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